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Evidence
W. Randall Bassett*
Val Leppert**
Lauren Newman Smith***
I. INTRODUCTION
term,1

In its 2021
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit issued several important and precedential opinions on
a number of evidentiary topics. For example, in two opinions, the court
considered the totality of the evidence to determine whether admission
of testimonial hearsay implicated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause or was instead harmless error.2 The court also twice addressed
whether a suggestion to the jury that a defendant’s silence was
substantive evidence of his guilt violated the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment rights.3
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit issued several opinions concerning
lay witness and expert testimony. In two opinions this term, the court
affirmed the district courts’ categorization of testimony as lay witness
testimony and therefore admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
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University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992). Member, State Bars of
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**Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Westminster College
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1. For an analysis of evidentiary topics during the prior Survey period, see W.
Randall Bassett et al., Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1149 (2021).
2. United States v. Powell, No. 20-1041, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 26243 (11th Cir.
Aug. 31, 2021); United States v. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d 858 (11th Cir. 2021).
3. Raheem v. GDCP Warden, 995 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Pate,
853 F. App’x 430 (11th Cir. 2021).

1215

1216

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

701.4 Regarding the admissibility of expert opinions, the court in four
cases followed its trend of deferring to the district courts on the use or
exclusion of expert testimony, affirming all four in published opinions.5
Lastly, the court also issued several opinions balancing Rule 401’s6
relevancy requirement against Rule 403’s7 grant of discretion to exclude
relevant evidence where “its probative value is substantially
outweighed” by, among other things, unfair prejudice or a likelihood of
confusion.8 The court further addressed the prohibition against
character evidence9 and hearsay in several opinions.10 This Survey
summarizes all of these rulings and provides the practitioner with a
concise overview of the most important developments in the law of
evidence.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPALS
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”11 In Crawford v. Washington,12 the Supreme Court of the

4. FED. R. EVID. 701. See United States v. Wheeler, 16 F.4th 805 (11th Cir. 2021);
Omni Health Sols., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 857 F. App’x 501 (11th Cir. 2021).
5. St. Louis Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Rockhill Ins. Co., 5 F.4th 1235 (11th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Castaneda, 997 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2021); Buland v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd.,
992 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2021); Prosper v. Martin, 989 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2021).
6. FED. R. EVID. 401.
7. FED. R. EVID. 403.
8. Id. See United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Coleman, 851 F. App’x 1016 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Sunmonu, 859 F. App’x 431
(11th Cir. 2021).
9. United States v. Perry, 14 F.4th 1253 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Jeune,
No. 19-13018, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25102 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2021); Colston, 4 F.4th at
1192; United States v. Collins, 861 F. App’x 362 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Louis,
860 F. App’x 625 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Acevedo, 860 F. App’x 604 (11th Cir.
2021); United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Diaz, 846
F. App’x 846 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Jones, 847 F. App’x 830 (11th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Pineda, 843 F. App’x 174 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Chukwu, 842
F. App’x 316 (11th Cir. 2021).
10. United States v. Sims, No. 19-13963, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 31734 (11th Cir. Oct.
21, 2021); Okwan v. Emory Healthcare Inc., No. 20-11467, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 27092,
at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2021); Nix v. Advanced Urology Ins. of Ga., No. 21-10106, 2021
U.S. App. LEXIS 24467 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2021); Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 878; United
States v. Hart, 841 F. App’x 180 (11th Cir. 2021).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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United States interpreted the clause as barring the admission of
“[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial,” unless “the
declarant is unavailable,” and the defendant “had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine” the declarant.13 The Court declined to define with
particularity what a “testimonial” statement is but identified a “core
class” of testimonial materials including “affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions,” as well as “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”14
Since Crawford, the Court has clarified the difference between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements by focusing on the “primary
purpose” of the questioning that elicited the out-of-court statement.15
Statements are testimonial “when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”16 Statements are
nontestimonial, however, “when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.”17 The Eleventh Circuit has also found
that statements are “clearly nontestimonial” when made “unwittingly”
to government informants because they are made “freely without a
reasonable belief that [they] . . . would be available for use at a later
trial.”18
In three opinions this term, the Eleventh Circuit looked at ancillary
evidence to reject a Confrontation Clause challenge. In United States v.
Powell,19 a detective noticed an SUV speeding and weaving through
traffic. After running the plates, the detective found inconsistencies
between the registered description and the vehicle, thereby suggesting
it was stolen, so he decided to perform a traffic stop. The driver and a
passenger—the defendant—both fled, after which the detective spotted
a firearm on the front of the SUV by the passenger side. A different
detective interviewed the defendant and requested a search warrant for
the contents of his phone, which revealed photos of the defendant

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 51–52.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Sims, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 31734, at *6.
No. 20-10941, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 26243 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2021).

1218

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

brandishing two different firearms. The defendant was found guilty of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.20
At trial, one of the detectives relayed statements made to her by two
other women who were riding in the back of the SUV.21 One of the
women told the detective “that she didn’t know anything,” that “the gun
wasn’t hers,” and that she was the defendant’s girlfriend.22 The
detective testified that the other woman told her “she didn’t know
anything about that gun and it wasn’t hers.”23
On appeal, the defendant argued that this testimony was
“testimonial hearsay” that violated the Confrontation Clause.24 The
Eleventh Circuit determined that even if the testimony violated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, any error was harmless.25 The
“statements were ancillary at worst and cumulative at best to the
government’s case.”26 Moreover, even though the defendant could not
cross-examine the hearsay declarants, “he was given ample opportunity
to cross [the detective].”27 The court went on to note that “the strength
of the government’s case alone ma[de] th[e] error harmless.”28 Because
“[t]he government’s case would have been no less persuasive if the
hearsay statements had been excluded,” the Eleventh Circuit found any
Confrontation Clause violation was harmless error.29
In United States v. Pendergrass,30 the defendant challenged the
admission of four statements, including “the statements of [the
defendant’s] girlfriend and her mother that [the defendant] lived in the
basement of their home.”31 Although the statements from the
defendant’s girlfriend and her mother concerning the defendant’s
residence were testimonial hearsay, the Eleventh Circuit determined
that the defendant could not show that their admission violated his
substantial rights because that information was established through
other means.32

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at *2–4.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *8–9.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9–10.
995 F.3d 858 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 878.
Id. at 880.
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The court further found that the remaining challenged statements
were not hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of the
matter asserted.33 Accordingly, the court determined that the
statements could not violate the Confrontation Clause.34 Relying on its
decision in United States v. Jiminez,35 the court reiterated that the
Confrontation Clause “‘prohibits only statements that constitute
impermissible hearsay’ because ‘the Clause . . . does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of
the matter asserted.’”36 Because the first three categories of challenged
testimony did not qualify as hearsay, the defendant’s Confrontation
Clause challenge necessarily failed.37
The defendant in Pendergrass argued on appeal that the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Charles38 warranted a different
result; however, the court disagreed.39 In Charles, the Eleventh Circuit
held that “a proper Confrontation Clause analysis does not begin or end
with a determination of whether a statement constitutes ‘impermissible
hearsay.’”40 The court then explained that the Confrontation Clause
analysis “first requires a determination of whether the declarant’s
statement is ‘testimonial,’ i.e. a declaration offered for the purpose of
proving some fact to be used at trial.”41 Because the first three
challenged statements were not offered for the truth of the matters
asserted nor to prove guilt, they were not testimonial hearsay and
therefore could not trigger the Confrontation Clause.
B. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
More commonly known as the right against self-incrimination, the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”42 The Supreme Court has explained that “statements
made during a custodial interrogation are not admissible at trial unless

33. Id. For a discussion of the court’s hearsay analysis on these statements, see infra
at Section IV.C.
34. Id.
35. 564 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
36. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 879 (quoting Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1286–87) (alterations
in original).
37. Id. at 879–80.
38. 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013).
39. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 880.
40. Id. at 1328 n.10.
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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the defendant was first advised of his rights, including the right against
self-incrimination.”43 An individual is considered to be “in custody” for
Miranda purposes when there is a “formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”44
The inquiry focuses on the perspective of a reasonable innocent person,
and “the actual, subjective beliefs of the defendant and the interviewing
officer on whether the defendant was free to leave are irrelevant.”45
In United States v. Vorasiangsuk, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that the defendant was not in custody for
Miranda purposes after the court considered the totality of the
circumstances.46 The interview in Vorasiangsuk was calm and cordial
and the agents did not “physically touch, threaten, point their guns at,
handcuff, or even raise their voices” to the defendant.47 Although the
court observed that “[t]he location of the interview is not necessarily
dispositive, [ ]courts are much less likely to find a custodial encounter
when the interrogation occurs ‘in familiar or at least neutral
surroundings, such as the suspect’s home.’”48 The fact that the
conversation took place at the defendant’s residence bolstered the
court’s conclusion that the defendant was not in custody.49
To protect an accused’s right to silence, the Fifth Amendment also
forbids suggesting to the jury that a defendant’s silence is substantive
evidence of his guilt.50 To determine whether such a suggestion has
been made, the Eleventh Circuit looks to whether either of the following
is true: “(1) the comment was ‘manifestly intended’ to invite the
impermissible inference of guilty; or (2) the nature of the comment was
such that a jury would ‘naturally and necessarily’ construe it as an
invitation to make an inference of guilt based on the defendant’s
silence.”51
During its 2021 term, the Eleventh Circuit twice affirmed the lower
court’s finding that certain suggestions to the jury did not violate a

43. United States v. Vorarut Vorasiangsuk, No. 19-13647, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS
23640, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45
(1966)).
44. United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006).
45. Id.
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348).
49. Id.
50. Pate, 853 F. App’x at 438.
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. In United States v. Pate,52 after
the government rested its case, the district court instructed the jury:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Government has rested its case
in chief. What remains now which we will take up in the morning, in
every criminal case—remember I explained to you at the beginning of
the trial that the Government has the burden of proof. The defendant
does not have the burden of proof. So in every criminal trial it is the
defendant’s decision whether or not to put forth a defense, and so in
the morning we will find out from the defense what witnesses or
evidence they wish to put forth, if any. And they’re not required to.
Remember that. That is their choice since the Government has the
burden of proof. Nevertheless, in the morning we will hear from the
Defendant—from the defense, again, if they make the decision to put
forth any evidence or any witnesses of any kind.53

The defendant did not object to the instruction, and ultimately
declined to present any testimony, exercising her Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent.54
On appeal, the defendant in Pate argued that the district court erred
in making the following statement: “In the morning we will hear from
the Defendant—from the defense, again, if they make the decision to
put forth any evidence or any witnesses of any kind.”55 The court
reviewed for plain error given that the defendant challenged the jury
instructions for the first time on appeal.56 Looking to the test described
above, the court found that the jury instructions bore neither offending
hallmark.57 First, the defendant herself believed, or at least presumed,
that the court’s statement about “hearing from the Defendant” was “a
slip of the tongue.”58 “The context and the words immediately following
those show it was obviously unintended. And an unintentional slip up is
the opposite of manifest intent.”59 Nor was there any suggestion that
the jury would have “naturally and necessarily” taken the court’s
statement as an invitation to infer guilt because the defendant failed to
testify.60 The statement did not instruct the jury to do that and “the
four words (‘hear from the Defendant’) appear in the middle of one
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

853 F. App’x 430 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 438.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sentence of a 147-word paragraph in which the court reiterates on four
occasions that [the defendant] d[id not] have to put forward a
defense.”61 To find a violation of the Fifth Amendment under these
circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit would have to assume that the jury
disregarded repeated instructions that the defendant was not required
to defend herself.
The Eleventh Circuit again deferred to the lower court on a ruling
addressing silence as substantive evidence of guilt in Raheem v. GDCP
Warden.62 In Raheem, the prosecutor said in closing argument:
“Raheem didn’t take the stand but you heard his videotaped statement.
And I submit to you that it ain’t true.”63 The defendant moved for a
mistrial, which the Henry County Superior Court denied, explaining:
I don’t know that it is a comment on his failure to take [the stand]. I
took it as how that information was coming from him. I certainly
think it would have been better left unsaid. But I don’t take it to be
any argument, for instance, that they should hold that against him
that he failed to take the stand. It was mainly pointing out to the
jury the source of the evidence you were about to tell them about, it
was a video tape.64

On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the
constitutional rule that “a prosecutor may not make any comment upon
a criminal defendant’s failure to testify at trial” was violated, but
nevertheless found any violation harmless.65
The defendant then filed a section 225466 petition in the district
court, raising many of the same claims.67 The district court granted a
certificate of appealability (COA) on the Fifth Amendment issue, among
others. The district court determined that none of the state court’s
findings were contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established law, nor were they unreasonable in light of the evidence
presented.68
Before the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant relied on the Supreme
Court of the United States’ ruling in Griffin v. California,69 for his Fifth

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
995 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 936.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
Raheem, 995 F.3d at 906.
Id.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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Amendment claim.70 In Griffin, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “forbids either
comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by
the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”71 However, in Chapman
v. California,72 the Supreme Court clarified that Griffin violations are
subject to harmless error review, explaining that “before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”73
According to the Eleventh Circuit, that was exactly what the Georgia
Supreme Court did here: “it found a Griffin violation, but held, under
Chapman, that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”74 The decisions in Pate and Raheem therefore illustrate the
difficulty a defendant faces in challenging on appeal suggestions of guilt
based on silence.
III. WITNESS OPINION TESTIMONY
A. Expert Testimony
Federal Rule of Evidence 70275 controls the admissibility of expert
testimony.76 Pursuant to that rule, the proponent of the evidence bears
the burden of showing that:
(1) [T]he expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a
fact in issue; (2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.77

With respect to the first factor, the question “is whether expert
testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case
that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.”78 The

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
States

Raheem, 995 F.3d at 936.
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Id. at 24.
Raheem, 995 F.3d at 937.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Perry, 14 F.4th at 1262.
St. Louis Condo. Ass’n, 5 F.4th at 1244 n.7.
Castaneda, 997 F.3d at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
v. Litzky, 18 F.4th 1296, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2021) (concluding expert’s testimony
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requirement that the testimony be helpful also “requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility.”79
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the requirement that testimony be
helpful twice in its 2021 term. In United States v. Castaneda,80 the
defendant was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor to engage
in unlawful sexual activity and traveling across a state line with the
intent to engage in sexual activity with a person under the age of twelve
years.81 At trial, the defendant attempted to put forward Dr. Herriot as
an expert in “Computer Mediated Communication” (CMC) on sexual
topics, to testify that statements made over the internet cannot be
reliably taken at face value “because people sometimes create fictitious
details on the internet.”82 The Unites States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia excluded Dr. Herriot’s testimony because it
had “not been shown to be relevant to this case.”83 The district court
explained that although Dr. Herriot’s report:
[I]ndicate[d] that he reviewed material “related” to this case, he
[went] on to say that he ha[d] not made any findings or drawn any
conclusions with respect to the particulars of this case, nor ha[d] he
conducted any analysis or made any recommendations regarding the
specifics of this case.84

The court concluded, at most:
Dr. Herriot would only be able to provide general background
information on CMC, without any specific opinion as to whether the
defendant in this case acted in accordance with CMC expectations,
and if so, what that mean[t] within the context of the charges in the
indictment, as well as any defenses thereto.85

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of Dr. Herriot’s
testimony because “that testimony was not specifically pegged to [the
defendant’s] communications but only contained generalized
background information that some people sometimes mix fact with
was inadmissible under Rule 702 because it was not “geared to any issue that the jury
was tasked with deciding.”).
79. Id. at 1330–31.
80. 997 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2021).
81. Id. at 1322.
82. Id. at 1330.
83. Id.
84. Id. (first alteration in original).
85. Id.
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fiction on the internet.”86 Dr. Herriot’s primary conclusion—that not all
communications on the internet are truthful—is “within the knowledge
of laypersons.”87 Put simply, “[n]o juror [would] need[] expert help
understanding that concept.”88 The Eleventh Circuit therefore held the
district court did not abuse its discretion.89
The Eleventh Circuit again addressed the requirement that
testimony be helpful in Prosper v. Martin,90 involving an altercation
between a taxicab driver and a police officer that resulted in the taxi
driver’s death.91 The taxi driver was driving in Miami when he
apparently lost consciousness and collided with a pole. The police officer
was called to the scene, where the taxi driver appeared to be “on
something” and was “acting weird.”92 Three facts were undisputed: that
the police officer tased the driver, that the driver bit on the police
officer’s finger, and that the police officer shot the driver three times in
the chest. The taxi driver’s wife filed suit against the officer on his
behalf. 93
The police officer moved to exclude two of the plaintiff’s expert
witnesses: Dr. Knox, an expert in “crime scene reconstruction” and Dr.
Kohrman, a neurologist.94 Dr. Knox offered opinions relating to the
circumstances of the altercation, the location of a surveillance camera,
and what the video showed. Dr. Kohrman offered an opinion relating to
the cause of the taxi driver’s unusual behavior the night of his death,
opining that he had likely suffered a stroke, seizure, or brain infection.
The district court granted the motion to exclude in part. It agreed that
Dr. Knox’s opinions interpreting the surveillance video would not be
helpful to a jury because Dr. Knox admitted that he did not “purport to
have some expertise to see anything in the video that somebody else
can’t see.”95 The court also found his testimony that the police officer
“could have fired a minimum of three rounds from his service weapon
and a maximum of four rounds” was unhelpful because it was

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id.
Id.
989 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
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undisputed that the officer fired at least three shots, and whether he
fired a fourth could be determined by a jury.96
As for Dr. Kohrman’s opinion regarding the cause of the driver’s
behavior, the lower court found that it was both unreliable and
unhelpful.97 It was unreliable because Dr. Kohrman merely concluded
that the driver may have suffered from one of three separate neurologic
events. It was unhelpful because the cause of the driver’s unusual
behavior was irrelevant to whether the officer’s use of force was
objectively reasonable, since the cause was unknown to the officer at
the time.98
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court abused its
discretion in excluding the opinions of Dr. Knox and Dr. Kohrman.99
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination that
the surveillance video was not helpful “because it did not offer anything
the jury could not discern on its own.”100 Even Dr. Knox admitted that
“[a]nyone . . . watching the video . . . is going to see the same thing.”101
The Eleventh Circuit also agreed with the district court that Dr.
Kohrman’s opinion regarding the cause of the driver’s erratic behavior
would not be helpful to a jury.102 Because the qualified immunity
analysis “is limited to the facts that were knowable to the defendant
officers at the time they engaged in the conduct in question,” whether
the driver was “drugged, intoxicated, or had suffered a neurological
episode was not relevant.”103
With respect to the reliability requirement, the Supreme Court set
forth the standard for analyzing whether an expert’s methodology is
reliable in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.104 Under this
standard, known as the Daubert standard, the court considers:
(1) [W]hether the expert’s methodology has been tested or is capable
of being tested; (2) whether the theory or technique used by the
expert has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether
there is a known or potential error rate of the methodology; and (4)

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1247–48.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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whether the technique has been generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community.105

These factors are not a “definitive checklist or test,” and the district
court has “considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to
go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable.”106 The goal of this inquiry is “to make certain that an expert,
whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”107 The
judge “must determine whether the evidence is genuinely scientific, as
distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine
scientist.”108 Importantly, the reliability inquiry scrutinizes the
principles and methodologies, not the conclusions they generate.109
In the 2021 term, the Eleventh Circuit published two opinions
addressing challenges under the Daubert standard.110 In both cases, the
court followed its trend of deferring to the district courts on the
admission or exclusion of expert testimony.
In Buland v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,111 Andre Ow Buland and his wife
boarded a cruise ship operated by Norwegian Cruise Lines (NCL).112
While on the cruise, Mr. Buland woke up with stomach pain. After
having acid reflux pain all day and ultimately vomiting, Mr. Buland
went to the ship infirmary. The ship’s doctors administered a blood test,
a chest x-ray, and an electrocardiogram. The tests showed that Mr.
Buland was having a heart attack, so the doctors admitted him to the
ship’s intensive care unit. The ship’s doctors consulted with the
Cleveland Clinic and determined that it was safest for Mr. Buland to
stay on the ship for treatment because they did not know whether there
were facilities to treat an arterial blockage in the closest port city.
Although the ship carried thrombolytic medications, which are “clotbusting medicines used to treat heart-attack patients,” the ship’s
doctors determined it was too risky to treat Mr. Buland with a

105. Prosper, 989 F.3d at 1249.
106. Id. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1248 (citing United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir.
2004)) (“[W]hen employing an abuse-of-discretion standard, we must affirm unless we find
that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal
standard.”).
111. 992 F.3d 1143 (11th Cir. 2021).
112. Id. at 1147.
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thrombolytic.113 They reasoned he experienced symptoms for too long,
and “had recently undergone medical procedures that created a risk
thrombolytics could cause life-threatening internal bleeding.”114 After
the ship arrived in Miami, a day-and-a-half later, an ambulance waiting
at the port took Mr. Buland to the hospital. He continues to suffer from
medical problems caused by the damage to his heart.115
Mr. Buland sued NCL for negligence, alleging the ship’s medical staff
failed to diagnose and properly manage his status and failed to
evacuate him from the ship.116 As part of his damages, he sought loss of
the capacity to earn money. To support his damages valuation, Mr.
Buland retained Dr. Gary A. Anderson, Ph.D. to testify about the value
of Mr. Buland’s lost earning capacity. NCL moved in limine to exclude
Dr. Anderson’s testimony on loss of earning capacity arguing that Mr.
Buland had no evidence to establish the magnitude of any diminished
capacity.117 NCL argued Dr. Anderson “was not a vocational expert and
his analysis was based only on [Mr. Buland’s] subjective opinions about
the work he could perform after his heart attack, not his actual postinjury earning capacity.”118 The district court granted the motion to
exclude. At trial, NCL moved for a directed verdict on the issue of lost
earning capacity. The district court granted the motion, agreeing that
Mr. Buland failed to prove the extent of any impairment of his earning
capacity with enough certainty for a jury to determine a reasonable
award.119
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
exclusion of Dr. Anderson’s testimony on the value of Mr. Buland’s lost
earning capacity.120 Dr. Anderson used the following steps to evaluate
the present value of Mr. Buland’s lost earning capacity: (1) he used Mr.
Buland’s actual history of earnings as his pre-injury earning capacity;
(2) he assumed modest yearly salary increases over the course of Mr.
Buland’s working life; (3) he subtracted the amount Mr. Buland would
be expected to earn in each of several post-injury careers; and (4) he
discounted the difference to present value and reported the resulting
number as Mr. Buland’s loss of earning capacity.121
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1151.
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The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Dr. Anderson’s testimony would
only be reliable to the extent the hypothetical careers it was based on
reliably approximated Mr. Buland’s actual post-injury earning
capacity.122 But Dr. Anderson’s assumption that Mr. Buland would not
have career opportunities more lucrative than, for example, working as
a part-time university teacher or member of a corporate board, was
entirely speculative.123 The court noted that “[t]o be admissible under
Daubert, an expert’s opinion must be ‘supported by good grounds for
each step in the analysis.’”124 Because “Dr. Anderson did not have good
grounds to support his assumption that there was no middle ground
between [Mr.] Buland’s suggestions about the kinds of part-time work
he could perform and the work as a senior finance professional he could
no longer perform,” the court determined that his testimony was
unreliable.125
The Eleventh Circuit again affirmed a lower court’s Daubert ruling in
St. Louis Condominium Association, Inc. v. Rockhill Insurance
Company.126 There, the St. Louis Condominium Association
(Association) told defendant Rockhill Insurance Company (Rockhill)
about property damage caused by Hurricane Irma. The Association
submitted a proof of loss form pursuant to the Rockhill policy, claiming
damages totaling $16 million. Rockhill’s inspectors, however,
determined that the damage to the property was “well below” the
Policy’s hurricane deductible.127 Rockhill therefore refused to pay for
repairs, and the Association filed suit. Rockhill moved to exclude three
of the Association’s experts: Paul Beers, the Association’s water leakage
expert; William Pyznar, the Association’s expert in building
engineering; and Hector Torres, a general contractor with a specialty in
high rise construction appraisals, who estimated the cost of repairing
the property.128
Rockhill challenged Mr. Torres’s methodology “because he spent only
5 hours at the Property, failed to conduct any testing, ‘relied
overwhelmingly on the reports of an undisclosed building engineer and
unit owners’ to conclude that repairing the Property would cost $16
million.”129 Rockhill argued Mr. Pyznar’s methodology was flawed

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
5 F.4th 1235 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1237–38.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1244.
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because “he also relied on information from an undisclosed building
engineer, as well as information ‘taken at face value’ from the
Association’s property manager.”130 Rockhill also challenged Mr.
Pyznar’s testimony because he “inspected only nine units and cherrypicked high-speed wind strength data from other parts of Florida in
order to reach his opinion that Hurricane Irma caused the damage to
the Property.”131 Lastly, Rockhill argued Mr. Beers’s opinion was
unreliable for two reasons: “(1) Beers d[id] not have a college degree and
therefore Rockhill believe[d] he [wa]s ‘incompetent,’ and (2) he
‘deliberately failed to consider pre-Hurricane Irma maintenance
records.’”132
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
found that Rockhill’s Daubert challenges “lacked merit.”133 Mr. Torres
“conducted a thorough review of the property by inspecting [two-thirds]
of the Property’s 130 units and the building’s exterior and roofing. Mr.
Torres also consulted the property manager and engineering staff to
determine if there were water damage complaints from unit owners
before the hurricane.”134 The district court further found that Mr.
Pyznar did not take the information he learned at face value; rather “he
visually inspected the property as well.”135 Finally, the judge found that
Mr. Beers’s opinion was not unreliable, recognizing that Mr. Beers “had
40 years of experience and specialized in water leak repairs.”136 The
district court concluded that Rockhill’s challenges went to the weight,
rather than the admissibility, of these experts’ opinions.137 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed, determining that the district court applied the
proper legal standard and that its fact findings were not “manifestly
erroneous.”138 The appellate court therefore concluded it was not an
abuse of discretion to deny Rockhill’s Daubert motion as to the three
experts.139

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 1244–45.
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Lay Witness Testimony
While Rule 702 is used to challenge an expert’s testimony, Rule 701
may be used to challenge the testimony of lay witnesses.140 Rule 701
requires that lay opinion testimony be “(a) rationally based on the
witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of
Rule 702.”141 Rule 701 was amended to “eliminate the risk that the
reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 would be evaded through
the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.”142
The Eleventh Circuit confronted Rule 701 in United States v.
Wheeler,143 which involved five co-defendants charged with wire fraud,
mail fraud, and conspiracy for alleged involvement in a telemarketing
scheme to defraud stock investors.144 The defendants operated from two
phone rooms, one in Florida and the other in California.145 Among the
witnesses who testified for the government was Stuart Rubens, who
took a job undercover in the Florida phone room.146 The district court
allowed Rubens to testify that the Florida phone room was a “boiler
room,” a term used to describe a salesroom that uses high-pressure
selling tactics.147 Rubens also identified and defined the roles that were
commonly assigned to salespeople in “boiler-room operations.”148
The defendants argued on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing Rubens to offer improper lay opinions.149 The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, finding Rubens’ testimony
satisfied the elements of Rule 701.150 His testimony was able to help the
jury by explaining some of the jargon used in the defendants’
conversations.151 Further, he was able to draw from his own experience
in the field to explain how “boiler rooms” functioned and the various
roles that salespeople generally played in such operations.152 The

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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150.
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FED. R. EVID. 701.
Id.
Omni Health Sols., 857 F. App’x at 517.
16 F.4th 805 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 811.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 827.
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Eleventh Circuit therefore determined that “[b]ecause Rubens’s
testimony was based on his own perceptions, was helpful to the jury,
and was not based on scientific or technical knowledge,” his lay opinion
was proper.153
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of improper lay opinion in
Omni Health Solutions, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Company.154
In Omni, Plaintiff Omni Health Solutions, LLC (Omni) obtained an
insurance policy from the defendant to cover its medical building in
Macon, Georgia.155 In 2011, Omni filed an insurance claim with the
defendant seeking coverage for a damaged and leaky roof. Although the
defendant agreed that covered damage existed, the parties were unable
to agree on a loss amount. Omni sued, claiming the defendant
“breached the Policy and acted in bad faith by failing to make a timely
coverage decision, underpaying the amount awarded for structural
damage, and refusing to compensate Plaintiff for the diminished value
of the property.”156
Plaintiff argued that the post-repair value of its property was
$500,000 less than its pre-loss value.157 To support that contention,
plaintiff cited the testimony of Dr. Green, Omni’s managing member. At
his deposition, Dr. Green opined that the property had lost an
estimated $500,000 in value as a result of the environmental conditions
that affected the property. Fourteen months after his deposition, Dr.
Green clarified the basis for his diminished value testimony in a
declaration opposing summary judgment.158 He stated that his opinion
was based on his:
[K]nowledge of the building, the nature of the damage to the
building, the resulting mold infestation in the building, the stigma
likely to attach to buildings that have endured the extent and
duration of damage that Omni’s building ha[d] endured, and the
commercial real estate market in the Macon metropolitan area,
including sales prices of comparable properties that have not suffered
the damage that Omni’s building has suffered.159

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
excluded Dr. Green’s testimony, finding him unqualified to proffer
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
857 F. App’x 501 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 501.
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Id. at 515–16.
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testimony regarding diminution in value.160 The court reasoned that Dr.
Green sought to proffer expert testimony, as opposed to lay opinion
testimony under Rule 701, because “diminution in value, by its very
nature and as opposed to a stagnant, moment-in-time value of property,
requires knowledge of the value of property but also some specialized
knowledge of the effects certain kinds of damages and repairs have on
the change in that value.”161
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court excluding Dr.
Green’s testimony because there was no abuse of discretion.162 It
observed that Rule 701 generally “does not prohibit lay witnesses from
testifying based on particularized knowledge gained from their own
personal experiences.”163 Additionally, the court observed that a
property owner is generally competent to testify regarding its value.164
“However, when an ‘owner bases his estimation solely on speculative
factors,’ courts may exclude the owner’s testimony.”165 The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the record lacked any evidence that Dr. Green
had any such particularized knowledge or experience regarding the
value of the repaired, mold-remediated properties.166 Nor did the record
reflect that “Dr. Green acquired any knowledge from outside sources,
such as a realtor, that could inform an opinion regarding the current
value of Plaintiff’s property.”167 Omni maintained that Dr. Green
acquired knowledge regarding the sales prices of medical buildings in
the Macon area through his experience in the Macon commercial real
estate market.168 The Eleventh Circuit nevertheless determined that
Omni failed to show that the sales on which Dr. Green based his
opinion involved repaired buildings affected by mold.169 “Without such
information, Dr. Green’s testimony regarding loss in value associated
with environmental factors [was] not ‘rationally based on his
perception,’” and therefore was not helpful to determining a fact in
issue.170
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Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that
Dr. Green’s testimony was based on specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702 and therefore was improper lay opinion testimony.171
The court concluded that:
Absent objective evidence of the current value of [Omni’s] property
(such as unsuccessful sales efforts, offers received, or estimates
provided by trained professionals), which could inform a lay opinion
regarding post-repair value, estimating the value of a repaired and
mold remediated building requires specialized knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.172

Because it was undisputed that Dr. Green was not an expert in
property valuation, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s
exclusion of Dr. Green’s diminished value testimony.173
IV. OTHER RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Balancing Relevance and Unfair Prejudice
Generally, the Federal Rules of Evidence consider all relevant
evidence admissible at trial.174 The Rules define relevant evidence
broadly as evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”175 In its 2021 term, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of irrelevant questioning in
United States v. Akwuba.176 There, the defendant was convicted of
issuing and conspiring to issue prescriptions for controlled substances
improperly; conspiring to commit health care fraud; and committing
health care fraud through her practice as a nurse practitioner. The
defendant sought to testify that a prescription pad belonging to one of
her collaborative physicians had been stolen and used to issue false or
fraudulent prescriptions. When asked to tell the jury about that and its
significance to the case, the government objected and the court
conducted a sidebar.177

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 518.
174. FED. R. EVID. 402; see also United States v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1304, 1314 (11th Cir.
2021) (“Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial.”).
175. FED. R. EVID. 401; see also Akwuba, 7 F.4th at 1314.
176. Akwuba, 7 F.4th at 1304.
177. Id. at 1313–14.
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During the sidebar, defense counsel said he did not know where his
own line of questioning was going or how it was relevant.178 Defense
counsel stated that his client gave him a list of questions she wanted
him to ask her and that was one of those questions. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama refused to allow the
defendant to present the evidence unless she could show that some of
the prescriptions the collaborative physician had described as forged
were relevant to this incident. The court then gave the defendant and
her counsel time to look through the prescription records, after which
defense counsel withdrew the line of questioning.179
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of the line of
questioning.180 It observed that the district court gave the defendant an
opportunity to review the records to “see if any prescriptions issued
from the stolen prescription pad were attributed to her.”181 Once
defense counsel told the court there was no issue, the line of questioning
about the stolen pad became irrelevant and inadmissible.182
Even if evidence is deemed relevant, Rule 403 allows courts to
exclude relevant evidence where “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”183 The Eleventh Circuit has long held that Rule 403 “is an
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”184 In a criminal
trial, because relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial, “it is only
when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the
rule permits exclusion.”185 Unfair prejudice in a criminal case “means
that the relevant evidence has the capacity to ‘lure the factfinder into
declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.’”186 In balancing the interests under Rule 403, the Eleventh
Circuit instructs courts to “consider, among other things, the
prosecutorial need for the evidence and the effectiveness of a limiting
instruction.”187 Further, the court “view[s] the evidence in the light
178. Id. at 1314.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. FED. R. EVID. 403 ; See also Sunmonu, 859 F. App’x at 433.
184. Coleman, 851 F. App’x at 1022 (“We ask whether the evidence was dragged in by
the heels solely for prejudicial impact.”).
185. Sunmonu, 859 F. App’x at 433 (citing United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631
(11th Cir. 1983)) (alterations in original).
186. Id. at 433–34 (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)).
187. Id. at 434.
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most favorable to admission, maximizing its probative value and
minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.”188
Pursuant to the scrutinous legal standard, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the introduction of purportedly prejudicial evidence in four
opinions in its 2021 term. In United States v. Sunmonu,189 officers
attempted to apprehend the defendant for driving a stolen vehicle, but
he fled the scene back to his apartment.190 When a detective arrived at
the apartment complex, she saw the defendant “reaching into his right
pocket.”191 A federal grand jury later indicted the defendant for
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, carrying a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. Before trial, the defendant moved in limine
to limit the government’s introduction of the testimony that he reached
for his front pocket during his arrest pursuant to Rule 403. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the
motion.192 At trial, another detective testified about the events
surrounding the defendant’s arrest, including the fact that the
defendant reached for a handgun during the struggle. That detective
also testified about his personal experience working drug cases.193
Specifically, the detective testified that from his seven years of
investigating drug cases, many of the cases “involved dealers who
possess guns on or near them” when arrested.194
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court misapplied
Rule 403 and erred when it allowed the government to present evidence
“(1) that he allegedly reached for a loaded firearm in his front pocket as
he was being arrested and (2) that drug dealers occasionally use guns to
collect debts and to intimidate others.”195 He argued that the evidence
should not have been admissible because it
had no probative value, was unnecessary, and was unfairly
prejudicial because it allowed the government to “tacitly argue to the
jury that [he] had intended to inflict serious harm upon, or murder,”
the officers who arrested him, and that it “speculatively painted him

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. (citing United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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as a menace” who uses [gun violence] to “threaten hapless drug users
with death.”196

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with respect to the testimony about
reaching for his pocket, the court determined that it was probative of
the elements establishing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).197 The
evidence was also probative to establish the knowledge requirement of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g),198 another of the charges against the defendant.199
With respect to the detective’s testimony that drug dealers often carry
loaded firearms, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that “there is a strong
presumption that a defendant aware of a weapon’s presence will think
of using it if his illegal activities are threatened”200 and that guns are
the “tools of the drug trade, as there is a frequent and overpowering
connection between the use of firearms and narcotics traffic.”201 The
court therefore concluded the testimony probative because it provided
contextual evidence as to why the defendant likely possessed the
firearm, which in turn showed that the firearm was not there “by
chance.”202 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.203
In United States v. Coleman,204 the defendant was convicted for bank
robbery.205 The defendant was not identified as the robber until eight
months after the robbery when a friend of his girlfriend reported him to
the police. The police followed this tip by speaking with the girlfriend,
who informed the police of the defendant’s confession to her on the day
of the robbery. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to prevent testimony
concerning two instances of domestic violence, allegedly committed by
the defendant. The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida denied the motion to exclude the domestic violence testimony.
It found that the testimony was essential to explain the girlfriend’s
delayed report of the robbery to police, and it was likely that the
defense would use the delay to undermine her credibility at trial.206
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling
on the domestic violence evidence.207 Although the testimony “could
provoke antipathy from the jury[,] . . . the government did not bring in
evidence of domestic abuse simply to paint [the defendant] in an
unfavorable light.”208 Rather, the testimony was admitted to establish
the credibility of an important witness.209 The domestic-violence
testimony “was critical to explaining why [the girlfriend] had fears
about reporting [the defendant’s] confession sooner.”210
In United States v. Williams,211 the defendant was charged and
convicted of sex trafficking three women—two of whom were minors
when he recruited them.212 Predictably, much of the evidence presented
at the defendant’s trial was graphic.213 The women described their work
as prostitutes and detailed the defendant’s violent punishments. During
their testimony, images of the women—sometimes nude, and sometimes
in lingerie—which were posted as online ads, were also introduced as
evidence. There were additional images and videos that the defendant
kept, including nude pictures of the girls in provocative poses and
videos of the girls engaged in sexual conduct. The defense argued at
trial that the admission of these files “went too far” under Rule 403.214
Because the defendant conceded the relevancy of the evidence, “the
only question on appeal [wa]s whether its probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”215 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida that the images and videos were
probative.216 To prove the defendant’s charges, the government needed
to show that the defendant knew force, threats of force, fraud, or
coercion would be used to cause his victims to engage in commercial
sex.217 The images and videos helped show how the defendant “exerted
complete dominance over his victims.”218 The images and videos also
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“corroborated the victims’ testimony that [the defendant] forced them to
engage in sexual acts.”219
The Eleventh Circuit also determined that the challenged evidence
was not unduly prejudicial.220 “To be sure, these images and videos
[were] graphic. But it is unsurprising, given the nature of the crime
itself, that explicit evidence would need to be introduced.”221 The court
also noted that to minimize the prejudicial impact of the graphic
evidence, the district court cautioned potential jurors that they would
hear testimony and view evidence of a “sexually explicit nature.”222 The
Eleventh Circuit held that because the district court “mitigated the
prejudicial effects of the evidence” by screening potential jurors, there
was no abuse in discretion in admitting these materials.223
In United States v. Colston,224 the defendant walked into a post office,
showed a tracking receipt on her phone, and walked out with a package
containing approximately $200,000 worth of cocaine.225 The defendant
was arrested and convicted of two different drug trafficking crimes. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Alabama erred by admitting text messages that
she illegally sold prescription pills.226 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that “the text messages rebutted the suggestion that she was not
familiar with drug trafficking and allowed the jury to infer that her
involvement in the charged crimes was no mere accident or mistake.”227
The district court gave a limiting instruction three times to lessen any
prejudicial impact of the messages, “cautioning the jury not to consider
the messages as evidence that [the defendant] had a propensity to
commit the charged crimes.”228 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the probative value of the text messages was not substantially
outweighed by undue prejudice, and the defendant failed to meet “the
heavy burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion.”229
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B. Character Evidence
While Federal Rule of Evidence 403 gives district courts the
discretionary power to exclude prejudicial evidence, Rule 404230
addresses a specific type of potentially prejudicial evidence: character
evidence. Rule 404(a) prohibits evidence of a person’s character or
character trait to “prove that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character or trait.”231 The admissibility of
evidence under Rule 404(b) is governed by a three-prong test:
First, the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the
defendant’s character; second, the act must be established by
sufficient proof to permit a jury finding that the defendant committed
the extrinsic act; third, the probative value of the evidence must not
be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice, and the evidence
must meet the other requirements of rule 403.232

The Rule is one of inclusion and favors admission “unless the
evidence ‘tends to prove only criminal propensity.’”233
With respect to the first prong, evidence of other wrongs is
admissible for other purposes, such as “proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident.”234 For example, in United States v. Acevedo,235 the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the admission of evidence of uncharged prior
incidents when offered to prove identity and modus operandi.236
The Eleventh Circuit additionally upheld the admission of evidence
when offered to prove knowledge twice in its 2021 term. First, in United
States v. Pierre-Louis,237 the defendant appealed a felon-in-possession
conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence of a prior felon-in-possession conviction under Rule
404(b).238 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, concluding that the previous
230. FED. R. EVID. 404.
231. Id. See also Chukwu, 842 F. App’x at 319.
232. United States v. Pineda, 843 F. App’x 174, 181 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United
States v. Delgado, 56 F.3d 1357, 1365 (11th Cir. 1995)); see also Elysee, 993 F.3d at 1347
(citing United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 238 (11th Cir. 2013)).
233. United States v. White, 848 F. App’x 830, 840 (11th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added);
see also Perry, 14 F.4th at 1274–75.
234. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); See, e.g., United States v. Maradiaga, 860 F. App’x 650,
653 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming admission of prior wrong to rebut allegation of
entrapment).
235. 860 F. App’x 604 (11th Cir. 2021).
236. Id. at 610.
237. 860 F. App’x 625 (11th Cir. 2021).
238. Id. at 628.

2022

EVIDENCE

1241

conviction was “relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s
character” such as “knowledge, intent, or absence of mistake.”239 To
convict the defendant of his felon-in-possession charge, the government
needed to prove that he knew he possessed a firearm.240 The court
reasoned that evidence showing that the defendant had knowingly
possessed a firearm in the past was probative of his knowledge to
possess a firearm in the present.241
Second, the Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United
States v. Colston.242 There, the court found evidence of prior drug
dealings admissible because it showed that the defendant had
knowledge that the package contained a controlled substance.243
With respect to intent, the Eleventh Circuit has previously explained
that “a not guilty plea in a drug conspiracy case makes intent a
material issue and opens the door to admission of prior drug-related
offenses as highly probative, and not overly prejudicial, evidence of a
defendant’s intent.”244 For example, in United States v. Perry,245 the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the admission of a prior drug-related offense
as evidence of the defendant’s intent where the defendant pleaded not
guilty.246
Similarly, in United States v. Jeune,247 a jury convicted the defendant
of conspiracy to defraud the government, filing false tax returns, and
assisting and advising in the preparation of false tax returns.248 Prior to
trial, the government filed a motion in limine to allow the introduction
of the defendant’s 2009 tax fraud conviction and the facts underlying
that conviction under Rule 404(b).249 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida ruled that the evidence was
admissible to prove intent and motive.250 On appeal, the defendant
argued that the government introduced the evidence of her prior
conviction “solely to demonstrate [her] alleged criminal propensity to

239. Id. at 634.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. supra Section IV.A.
243. Colston, 4 F.4th at 1192.
244. Perry, 14 F.4th at 1275 (quoting United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2015)).
245. 14 F.4th 1253 (11th Cir. 2021).
246. Id. at 1274–75.
247. No. 19-13018, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 25102 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2021).
248. Id. at *2.
249. Id. at *17.
250. Id. at *18.
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commit tax fraud.”251 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that
because she entered a “not guilty plea,” intent was a material issue.252
Therefore, to satisfy its burden of proving intent, the government could
rely on qualifying 404(b) evidence.253
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the impact of strong evidence
against the defendant on the first prong—relevance to an issue other
than the defendant’s character—in United States v. Jones254 and United
States v. Collins.255 In Jones, a federal grand jury indicted the
defendant on multiple counts of distribution of cocaine.256 Before trial,
the government gave notice that it intended to introduce evidence of a
2006 guilty plea for a controlled substances violation. The defendant
objected to the evidence, arguing it was highly prejudicial, but the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
overruled the objection without further argument and gave the jury a
Rule 404(b) limiting instruction.257
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit conceded that whether the Rule
404(b) evidence in this case met the three-pronged test was a “close
question.”258 With respect to the first prong, “the government had little
incremental need for the evidence.”259 In fact, the government had a
plethora of other strong evidence, obviating the need for the previous
drug plea.260 “When the government has a strong case without the
extrinsic evidence, fairness dictates that the extrinsic evidence should
be excluded.”261 But the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the strong
evidence that led it to question the necessity of admitting the plea
agreement also led it “to conclude that any error was harmless.”262
In Collins, the defendant appealed her conviction for conspiracy to
import cocaine arguing the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida abused its discretion by admitting a 2001 conviction
251. Id. at *20.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 847 F. App’x 830 (11th Cir. 2021).
255. 861 F. App’x 362 (11th Cir. 2021).
256. Jones, 847 F. App’x at 832.
257. Id. at 833.
258. Id. at 835.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.; see also United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 521 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f
the government has a strong case on intent without the extrinsic [evidence] . . . then the
prejudice to the defendant will outweigh the marginal value of the extrinsic offense
evidence and it will be excluded.”).
262. Jones, 847 F. App’x at 835.

2022

EVIDENCE

1243

for the sale or delivery of cannabis.263 She argued that the probative
value of the prior conviction was substantially outweighed by undue
prejudice “because the prior offense [wa]s substantially different from
and remote in time to the charged offense and because the government
had other evidence of her intent and knowledge.”264 Like Jones, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that it “need not decide whether the
district court abused its discretion in admitting [the] prior conviction,”
because any error was harmless.265 Again, the court relied on the
significant strength of the government’s other evidence.266
An otherwise strong case would suggest that certain character
evidence is likely being introduced solely as character evidence—
relevant only to the defendant’s character, which is prohibited.
However, the decisions in Jones and Collins suggest that a strong case
likewise makes it very challenging to find reversible error based on the
first prong.
With respect to the third prong, district courts should consider,
among other things, “prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the
extrinsic act and the charged offense, and temporal remoteness.”267
Although similarities between the other act and charged offense will
make the other offense highly probative with regard to intent, the
“more closely the extrinsic offense resembles the charged offense, the
greater the prejudice to the defendant since it increases the likelihood
that the jury will convict [him] because he is the kind of person who
commits this particular type of crime or because he was not punished
for the extrinsic offense.”268
The Eleventh Circuit confronted the third prong twice in its 2021
term. First, in United States v. Elysee,269 the defendant argued on
appeal that the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida abused its discretion by admitting into evidence one of his prior
armed robbery convictions.270 He specifically argued that the lower
court should have redacted all references to “armed robbery” or “deadly
weapon” in his conviction, leaving only the information that it was a

263. Collins, 861 F. App’x at 363.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 364.
266. Id.
267. United States v. Tercero, 859 F. App’x 506, 508 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United
States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1332 (11th Cir. 1997)).
268. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
269. 993 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2021).
270. Id. at 1347.
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“firearm conviction.”271 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed for two
reasons.272
First, the redacted version of the defendant’s conviction “was not
equally as probative for its relevant purpose as the unredacted version
of the conviction.”273 Admitting that the defendant had a previous
“firearm conviction” would not have provided as much information
“about his familiarity with firearms as admitting his conviction for
carrying a firearm in an armed robbery.”274 For example, it would not
have “demonstrated his familiarity with how a firearm feels when it is
held and carried.”275 It would also not address the defendant’s
knowledge of how to obtain a firearm illegally.276
Second, “even assuming the two versions were equally probative, [the
defendant] ha[d] not shown that the District Court clearly abused its
discretion by admitting the unredacted conviction.”277 The Eleventh
Circuit observed that the defendant’s argument—that the court “should
compare the redacted and unredacted versions and decide whether it
was an abuse of discretion not to redact the conviction”—is not how it
reviews Rule 404(b) rulings.278 Rather, the court’s “only concern [wa]s
whether the prejudicial effect of the Rule 404(b) conviction, as it was
allowed by the District Court (i.e., unredacted), substantially
outweighed the conviction’s probative value.”279 Here, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded the answer was no. Although the defendant’s prior
conviction for armed robbery “carried some danger of prejudicing the
jury against him,” the court observed that it is a tough standard to
show that the prejudicial effect of the evidence “substantially
outweighed” its probative value.280
The Eleventh Circuit again confronted the third prong in United
States v. Pineda.281 There, the defendant was indicted for health care
fraud and conspiracy to commit healthcare and wire fraud.282 At trial, a
special agent testified that two of the checks the defendant cashed were

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1347–48.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
843 F. App’x 174 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 176.
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from a specific pharmacy and signed by the pharmacy’s owner. The
agent further testified that the pharmacy owner had been previously
convicted of healthcare fraud and had introduced the defendant to his
coconspirators.283 The defendant objected to this testimony, arguing it
had no probative value, was “gratuitous,” and unfairly prejudicial; the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
overruled the objection.284
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erred by
allowing the government to elicit testimony that the pharmacy owner
had been convicted of healthcare fraud and that he was associated with
him.285 In addressing the third prong—whether the probative value of
the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudice—the court
concluded that the evidence of the relationship was significant and
therefore probative to the government’s case.286 The testimony
explained how the defendant met his coconspirators and was therefore
relevant to show the origins of the fraud at issue.
The Eleventh Circuit also determined that the probative value was
not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice because the jury
already knew that the defendant worked for another individual, Pablo
Garcia Menendez, who was an experienced fraudster.287 “[A] passing
reference to another fraudster didn’t tip the prejudice scale
substantially.”288 The court also observed that the evidence was “not a
major feature of the trial.”289 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
“the district court took affirmative steps to mitigate any unfair
prejudice caused by the rule 404(b) evidence.”290 Specifically, the district
court gave the jury a limiting instruction about the evidence and told
the jury “to be very mindful to not consider this evidence to decide if
[the defendant] engaged in the activity alleged in the indictment.”291
According to the Eleventh Circuit, these instructions reduced the risk of
any unfair prejudice to the defendant.292 The Eleventh Circuit therefore
held the district court did not abuse its discretion based on the
importance of the Rule 404(b) evidence to the government’s case, the

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 178.
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Id. at 181.
Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 182.
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Id. at 182–83.
Id. at 183.
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fact that the jury knew the defendant was associated with other
healthcare fraudsters, and the limiting instruction given by the district
court.293
Evidence of other wrongs also falls outside the scope of Rule 404(b),
making it independently admissible, if it is intrinsic evidence.294
Evidence is intrinsic if it is “linked in time and circumstances with the
charged crime and concerns the context, motive or setup of the crime; or
forms an integral part of the crime; or is necessary to complete the story
of the crime.”295 Where evidence is inextricably intertwined with the
crimes charged, the Eleventh Circuit “has refused to find that the
evidence should nonetheless be excluded as unduly prejudicial under
Rule 403.”296
In United States v. Chukwu,297 the defendant sought to exclude bank
records and related screenshots and photographs from outside of the
time period of the alleged offense conduct.298 The Eleventh Circuit
ultimately concluded that the evidence was inextricably intertwined
with evidence of the charged offense and was therefore admissible
under Rule 404(b).299 The screenshots showed financial transactions
that occurred within a year of the conduct charged in this case. They
also demonstrated conduct similar to the charged offense—money
deposited into Chukwu’s accounts and then transferred in large batches
to foreign bank accounts. Because the screenshots were “linked in time
and circumstances with the charged crime and concern[ed] the context,
motive or setup of the crime” and “necessary to complete the story of the
crime,” the Eleventh Circuit upheld the lower court’s admission of
evidence.300
In United States v. Diaz,301 the defendant appealed her convictions
for conspiring to defraud the United States and receiving illegal health
care kickbacks for referring individuals to Medicare.302 The defendant
argued that the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida erred when it denied her motion to exclude evidence of her
prior involvement with other home health care agencies in patient-
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295.
296.
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Chukwu, 842 F. App’x at 320.
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842 F. App’x 314 (11th Cir. 2021).
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referral schemes.303 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the admission of the
defendant’s prior involvement, reasoning that it was inextricably
intertwined with and probative of how the defendant became involved
with the health care agencies at issue.304 Specifically, the evidence of
her involvement explained how she came to know certain individuals
and joined the conspiracy of which she was found guilty.305
C. Rule Against Hearsay
The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibit the admission of
hearsay statements at trial. Rule 801306 defines hearsay as an out-ofcourt statement offered for “the truth of the matter asserted.”307
Therefore, a statement is not hearsay if it is not offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.308 During its 2021 term, the Eleventh Circuit
issued three opinions addressing statements that were purportedly not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
In Pendergrass, a special agent testified that his investigation into
the defendant’s armed robberies began in 2017 when he obtained cell
phone “tower dumps.”309 The tower dumps provided the agent with the
phone numbers that had accessed the cell towers closest to the robbery
locations around the time of the robberies. From these results, the
agent identified two phone numbers that were near three of the robbery
locations. The agent also testified about another potential suspect that
law enforcement had eliminated from consideration—Quintarious
Luke.310
The defendant argued that certain statements were inadmissible
hearsay. Specifically, the defendant contested the agent’s testimony
concerning “(1) the contents of the tower-dump records, (2) others’
statements about potential suspect Quintarious Luke, [and] (3) the
statements of [people] who said surveillance video was not
available[.]”311 The Eleventh Circuit held that none of the challenged
statements were hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of

303. Id. at 849.
304. Id. at 850.
305. Id.
306. FED. R. EVID. 801.
307. Id. See also Hart, 841 F. App’x at 182.
308. United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1494 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A statement is
not subject to the hearsay rule . . . unless it is offered ‘to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.’”).
309. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 869; supra Section II.A.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 878.
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the matter asserted.312 Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, “statements
by out-of-court witnesses to law enforcement may be admitted as nonhearsay if they help explain the course of a complex investigation, and
the danger of unfair prejudice caused by the used of the statements
does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.”313
The court reasoned that these statements were admissible under this
rule “because that evidence showed why [the agent] focused his
investigation on [the defendant] and excluded other potential suspects
during his investigation.”314
For example, the government did not offer the testimony about the
unavailability of other surveillance videos to prove the accuracy of that
statement.315 Similarly, the testimony about Quintarious Luke—such
as his physical description—was not offered for its truth. Rather, the
government was attempting to show the steps the agent took during his
investigation. With respect to the cell-site data, an FBI special agent
testified as to how the data was collected, read, and reported. Records
reflecting the substance of the data were also admitted into evidence, so
when the agent discussed the records, they were already in evidence.
Because the statements were either not introduced for the truth of the
matter asserted, or were otherwise corroborated, the Eleventh Circuit
therefore affirmed their admission.316
In United States v. Sims,317 agents of the Alabama Law Enforcement
Agency employed a confidential source to make three controlled drug
purchases from the defendant. The agents initiated the telephone calls,
which were recorded. During the first call, the defendant responded
“yes” when asked if he could sell the confidential source an “onion ring
or something.”318 During the second call, the source said he would get
some money and “come that way tomorrow,” to which the defendant
replied, “Alright.” On the third call, the source stated he was driving to
a Home Depot store to meet the defendant, and the defendant
responded “Alright,” again. The source passed away at a later date. 319
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing Jiminez, 564 F.3d at 1288); see also Elysee, 993 F.3d at 1339 (“[T]he
government in a criminal case may in some circumstances introduce out-of-court
statements through investigative officers either (1) to explain the course of a complex
investigation or (2) to rehabilitate officers after the defense has impugned their motives or
behavior in the investigation.”).
314. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 878.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. No. 19-13963, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 31734 (11th Cir. Oct. 21, 2021).
318. Id. at *2.
319. Id. at *3.
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After his indictment, the defendant moved to suppress the audio
recordings on the grounds they contained hearsay.320 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the motion,
but gave the defendant leave to make specific evidentiary objections at
trial. The recordings were eventually admitted at trial. On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in categorizing the statements as non-hearsay, because they were
offered not for their truth, “but to give context to [the defendant’s] oneword responses.”321 As the district court observed, the statements
provided “the question . . . to understand the answer,” and therefore,
the statements were not inadmissible hearsay.322
Under Rule 801(d)(2),323 a statement is also not hearsay if it is
offered against an opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative
capacity; (B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed
to be true; (C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to
make a statement on the subject; (D) was made by the party’s agent
or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and
while it existed; or (E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during
and in furtherance of the conspiracy.324

When the statement is made directly by a defendant, Rule 801(d)(2)’s
application is fairly straightforward.325 The analysis is more complex,
however, when the statement was made by a coconspirator.
For a statement to qualify under the coconspirator exemption, the
government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) a
conspiracy existed; (2) the conspiracy included the declarant and the
defendant against whom the statement is offered; and (3) the declarant
made the statement during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”326
The Eleventh Circuit applies “a liberal standard in determining
whether a statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy.”327
Therefore, a lower court’s determination that a statement was made in
320. Id. at *3–*4.
321. Id. at *5.
322. Id. (alteration in the original).
323. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
324. Id.
325. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 844 F. App’x 113, 117 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming
district court’s admission of body-camera footage because statements made in the footage
“were made by [the defendant] and were therefore admissible under the party-opponent
hearsay exception.”).
326. Hart, 841 F. App’x at 182.
327. Id.
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furtherance of a conspiracy “will not be reversed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous.”328
During the 2021 term, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
coconspirator exemption in one opinion, reiterating the above-cited law
and continuing its trend of affirming the admission of out-of-court
statements under this exemption. In United States v. Hart,329 the
government presented testimony from five of the defendant’s
coconspirators about selling drugs to the defendant or purchasing drugs
from the defendant. Another witness testified that he sold heroin for an
individual and that the defendant was that individual’s supplier.330
During his testimony, this witness testified that the individual told him
to stay away from the defendant because the defendant had “beat [his]
uncle out of $40,000.”331 After the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida overruled a hearsay objection, the witness
further elaborated that after what the individual told him, he sent
someone else to purchase drugs from the defendant. After the witness
finished testifying, the district court explained its ruling stating that
the evidence established that there was a drug conspiracy involving the
defendant, the witness, and the individual. Therefore, the court
explained the individual’s statement was made during the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy and was admissible as an exemption to
the hearsay rule. The district court also expressed its skepticism
whether the statement was even offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.332
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit began its discussion by observing the
standard of review: “the improper admission of a co-conspirator’s
hearsay statement is subject to the harmless error rule” and
“[i]mproper admission of a co-conspirator’s hearsay statement is
harmless when it had no substantial influence on the outcome and
sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict.”333 After reviewing the
record, there was no error.334 First, the individual’s statement that the
defendant “beat his uncle out of $40,000” was not offered for the truth of
the matter asserted, “but, rather, was offered to explain why [the
witness] never dealt with [the defendant] directly.”335 But even
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir. 1994)).
841 F. App’x 180 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
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assuming that the statement was hearsay, any error was harmless
because there was more than sufficient evidence to independently prove
the defendant’s guilt.336
Separate and distinct from Rule 801(d)’s exemptions to the
prohibition against hearsay are Rule 803’s337 exceptions to the rule
against hearsay. For instance, Rule 803(3) provides that statements “of
the declarant’s then-existing state of mind” are not excluded by the rule
against hearsay.338 In its 2021 term, the Eleventh Circuit twice
affirmed the admission of testimony as a then-existing state of mind.
First, in Nix v. Advanced Urology Institute of Georgia, PC,339 the
plaintiff filed a discrimination claim based on disability against
Advanced Urology Institute of Georgia (AUI).340 The plaintiff had been
deaf since birth and communicated primarily through American Sign
Language (ASL). When securing a urology appointment at AUI, the
plaintiff requested an interpreter at her appointment. Missy Sherling,
the Vice President of Clinical Strategy, called the plaintiff back and
assured her that AUI found a “certified” interpreter. AUI hired this
interpreter after a call center employee named Samantha Fazzolare
mentioned she had a friend who knew ASL. The interpreter, however,
was not certified, only had three years of high school classes, and
described his skills as “intermediate.”341 The plaintiff later sued AUI,
arguing it intentionally discriminated against her in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.342 Sherling testified that Fazzolare, the call center employee, had
informed her that the interpreter was qualified. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary
judgment for AUI, finding that the plaintiff failed to show deliberate
indifference, and the plaintiff appealed.343
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that Fazzolare’s statement to
Sherling was inadmissible hearsay.344 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
reasoning that the relevance of Sherling’s testimony was “in her state of
mind regarding [the interpreter’s] qualification, not in the substance of
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her conversation with Fazzolare.”345 The court therefore affirmed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment.346
Second, in Okwan v. Emory Healthcare,347 Dr. Derick Okwan, a black
male born in Ghana, was a resident in the oncology residency program
at Emory University’s School of Medicine. Due to poor performance, Dr.
Okwan was dismissed from the program. Dr. Okwan later sued Emory,
asserting claims of race and national-origin discrimination under Title
VII and claims of race discrimination under section 1981.348 Following
discovery, Emory moved for summary judgment, which the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted.349
On appeal, Dr. Okwan argued that the district court erred in
considering declarations by various Emory faculty members for
purposes of summary judgment.350 He argued that the declarations
were out-of-court statements and therefore inadmissible hearsay.351 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, reasoning that the alleged hearsay statements were not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but instead were offered to
demonstrate the declarants’ state of mind.352
The Emory faculty members who provided declarations did so to
explain why the members of the [Clinical Compensation Committee]
concluded that Dr. Okwan’s residency contract should not be
renewed. That is, the declarations were offered to show that the
[Clinical Compensation Committee’s] decision was motivated by Dr.
Okwan’s consistently poor performance in his residency program, not
racial or national origin bias.353
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